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Abstract
In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path,
which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Such games are central in formal verification since
they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. We study bidding
games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Two bidding rules have been defined. In
Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the
token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is similar except that the winner of the bidding pays
the “bank” rather than the other player. While poorman reachability games have been studied before,
we present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration poorman games. A central quantity in these
games is the ratio between the two players’ initial budgets. The questions we study concern a necessary
and sufficient ratio with which a player can achieve a goal. For reachability objectives, such threshold
ratios are known to exist for both bidding rules. We show that the properties of poorman reachability
games extend to complex qualitative objectives such as parity, similarly to the Richman case. Our most
interesting results concern quantitative poorman games, namely poorman mean-payoff games, where we
construct optimal strategies depending on the initial ratio, by showing a connection with random-turn
based games. The connection in itself is interesting, because it does not hold for reachability poorman
games. We also solve the complexity problems that arise in poorman bidding games.
1 Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are a central class of games in formal verification [3] and have
deep connections to foundations of logic [34]. They are used to model the interaction between a system and
its environment, and the problem of synthesizing a correct system then reduces to finding a winning strategy
in a graph game [32]. Theoretically, they have been widely studied. For example, the problem of deciding
the winner in a parity game is a rare problem that is in NP and coNP [21], not known to be in P, and for
which a quasi-polynomial algorithm was only recently discovered [10].
A graph game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex in the graph, which the players move throughout
the graph to produce an infinite path (“play”) pi. The game is zero-sum and pi determines the winner or pay-
off. Two ways to classify graph games are according to the type of objectives of the players, and according
to the mode of moving the token. For example, in reachability games, the objective of Player 1 is to reach a
designated vertex t, and the objective of Player 2 is to avoid t. An infinite play pi is winning for Player 1 iff
it visits t. The simplest mode of moving is turn based: the vertices are partitioned between the two players
and whenever the token reaches a vertex that is controlled by a player, he decides how to move the token.
We study a new mode of moving in infinite-duration games, which is called bidding, and in which
the players bid for the right to move the token. The bidding mode of moving was introduced in [26, 27]
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for reachability games, where two bidding rules were defined. The first bidding rule, called Richman rule
(named after David Richman), is as follows: Each player has a budget, and before each move, the players
submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget. The player
who bids higher wins the bidding, pays the bid to other player, and moves the token. The second bidding
rule, which we focus on in this paper and which is called poorman bidding in [26], is similar except that
the winner of the bidding pays the “bank” rather than the other player. Thus, the bid is deducted from his
budget and the money is lost. Note that while the sum of budgets is constant in Richman games, in poorman
games, the sum of budgets shrinks as the game proceeds.
Bidding for moving is a general concept that is relevant in any setting in which a scheduler needs to
decide the order in which selfish agents perform actions. For example, in a multi-process system, a scheduler
decides the order in which the processes execute. Allowing the processes to bid for moving is one method
to resolve this conflict, and it ensures that processes never starve, a property that is called fairness. Systems
that use internal currency to prevent free-riding are called “scrip systems” [23], and are popular in databases
for example. Other examples in which bidding for moving can be used to determine agent ordering include
multi-rounded negotiations [35], sequential auctions [28], and local search for Nash equilibria [18].
Poorman bidding is appropriate in modeling settings in which the agents pay the scheduler to gain
priority. In order to accept payment, a scheduler needs to be a selfish entity. An example of such a scheduler
appears in Blockchain technology like the one used in Bitcoin or Etherium. Simplifying the technology,
a blockchain is a log of transactions issued by clients and maintained by miners. In order to write to the
log, clients send their transactions and an offer for a transaction fee to a miner, who has freedom to decide
transaction priority. A vulnerability of Etherium was recognized in which a client was able to extract money
by colluding with the miner and gaining priority for his transactions.1 As another example, when the agents
are buyers in a sequential auction, the scheduler models the auctioneer, and the agents’ winning bids are its
revenue [20].
An advantage of the poorman rule over the Richman rule is that they generalize easily to other important
domains such as multi-player games, where the restriction of fixed sum of budgets in Richman bidding, is
an obstacle. For example, it is easier to add to poorman games a re-charge of the budget, say at special
vertices, which is natural in many applications. Also, our games are full-information games; a player knows
the budget of the other player and can use this information in his biddings. Extending poorman rules to
incorporate partial information is more natural. Historically, however, poorman bidding was less studied
than Richman bidding since they are technically more difficult as we elaborate later.
A central quantity in bidding games is the ratio of the players’ initial budgets. Formally, let Bi ∈ IR≥0,
for i ∈ {1, 2}, be Player i’s initial budget. The total initial budget is B = B1 + B2 and Player i’s initial
ratio is Bi/B. The first question that arises in the context of bidding games is a necessary and sufficient
initial ratio for a player to guarantee winning. For reachability games, it was shown in [26, 27] that such
threshold ratios exist in every Richman and poorman reachability game: for every vertex v there is a ratio
Th(v) ∈ [0, 1] such that (1) if Player 1’s initial ratio exceeds Th(v), he can guarantee winning, and (2) if
his initial ratio is less than Th(v), Player 2 can guarantee winning. This is a central property of the game,
which is a form of determinacy, and shows that no ties can occur.2
An interesting probabilistic connection was observed in [26, 27] for reachability Richman games. For
r ∈ [0, 1], the random turn-based game that corresponds to a game G w.r.t. r, denoted RTBr(G), is a
special case of stochastic game [16] in which, rather than bidding for moving, in each round, independently,
Player 1 is chosen to move with probability r and Player 2 moves with the remaining probability of 1 − r.
The probabilistic connection is the following: the probability with which Player 1 can guarantee reaching
1For further details see: http://bit.ly/2obzyE7.
2When the initial budget of Player 1 is exactly Th(v), the winner of the game depends on how we resolve draws in biddings,
and our results hold for any tie-breaking mechanism.
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his target in the uniform game RTB0.5(G) from a vertex v equals 1− Th(v) in G. For poorman reachability
games, no such probabilistic connection is known. Moreover, such a connection is unlikely to exist since
unlike in the Richman case, there are finite poorman games with irrational threshold ratios. The lack of a
probabilistic connection makes poorman games technically more complicated.
More interesting, from the synthesis and logic perspective, are infinite winning conditions, but they have
only been studied in the Richman setting previously [5]. We show, for the first time, existence of threshold
ratios in qualitative poorman games with infinite winning conditions such as parity. The proof technique is
similar to the one for Richman bidding: we show a linear reduction from poorman games with qualitative
objectives to poorman reachability games.
Things get more interesting in poorman mean-payoff games, which are quantitative games; an infinite
play pi of the game is associated with a payoff c ∈ IR≥0, which is Player 1’s reward and Player 2’s cost.
Accordingly, we refer to the players in a mean-payoff game as Max and Min. The payoff of pi is determined
according to the weights it traverses and, as in the previous games, the bids are only used to determine whose
turn it is to move. The central question in these games is: Given a value c ∈ Q, what is the initial ratio that
is necessary and sufficient for Max to guarantee a payoff of c? More formally, we say that c is the value with
respect to a ratio r ∈ [0, 1] if for every  > 0, we have (1) when Max’s initial ratio is r+ , he can guarantee
a payoff of at least c, and (2) intuitively, Max cannot hope for more: if Max’s initial ratio is r − , then Min
can guarantee a payoff of at most c.
Our most technically-involved contribution is a construction of optimal strategies in poorman mean-
payoff games, which depend on the initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. The crux of the solution is reasoning about
strongly-connected games: we first reason on the bottom strongly-connected components of a game graph
and extend the solution by, intuitively, playing a reachability game in the rest of the graph. Before describing
our solution, let us highlight an interesting difference between Richman and poorman rules. With Richman
bidding, it is shown in [5] that a strongly-connected Richman mean-payoff game has a value that does not
depend on the initial ratio and only on the structure of the game. It thus seems reasonable to guess that the
initial ratio would not matter with poorman bidding as well. We show, however, that this is not the case;
the higher Max’s initial ratio is, the higher the payoff he can guarantee. We demonstrate this phenomenon
with the following simple game. Technically, each vertex in a mean-payoff game is labeled by a weight.
Consider an infinite play pi. The energy of a prefix pin of length n of pi, denoted E(pin), is the sum of the
weights it traverses. The payoff of pi is lim infn→∞E(pin)/n.
Example 1. Consider the mean-payoff bidding game that is depicted in Figure 1, where for convenience
the weights are placed on the edges rather than the vertices. We take the viewpoint of Min in this example.
We consider the case of r = 12 , and claim that the value with respect to r =
1
2 is 0. Note that the players’
choices upon winning a bid in the game are obvious, and the difficulty in devising a strategy is finding the
right bids. Intuitively, Min copies Max’s strategy. Suppose, for example, that Min starts with a budget of
1+  and Max starts with 1, for some  > 0. A strategy for Min that ensures a payoff of 0 is based on a stack
of numbers as follows: In round i, if the stack is empty Min bids  · 2−i, and otherwise the first number of
the stack. If Min wins, he removes the first number on the stack (if non-empty). If Max wins, Min pushes
Max’s winning bid on the stack. For example, suppose Max’s bid in the first bidding is 0.2, he wins and
Min pushes 0.2 on the empty stack. Suppose Max bids 0.3 in the second bidding, then he wins again since
Min’s bid is 0.2. Suppose Max bids 0.1 in the third bidding, then Min wins with his bid of 0.3 and pops it
from the stack. In the next bidding his bid is 0.2. It is not hard to show that Min never bids higher than the
available budget. Also, we can show that every Max win is eventually matched, thus Min’s queue empties
infinitely often and the energy hits 0 infinitely often. Since we use lim inf in the definition of the payoff,
Min guarantees a non-positive payoff. Showing that Max can guarantee a non-negative payoff with an initial
ratio of 12 +  is harder, and a proof for the general case can be found in Section 4.
We show that the value c decreases with Max’s initial ratio r. We set r = 13 . Suppose, for example,
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Figure 1: A mean-payoff game.
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Figure 2: A second mean-payoff game.
that Min’s initial budget is 2 +  and Max’s initial budget is 1. We claim that Min can guarantee a payoff
of −1/3. His strategy is similar to the one above, only that whenever Max wins with b, Min pushes b to the
stack twice. Now, every Max win is matched by two Min wins, and the claim follows.
In order to solve strongly-connected poorman mean-payoff games, we identify a probabilistic connection
for these games. Consider such a game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that RTBr(G) is a random turn-based
game in which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1 − r. The game
RTBr(G) is a stochastic mean-payoff game, and its value, denoted MP(RTBr(G)), is the optimal expected
payoff that the players can guarantee. The probabilistic connection we show is that the value in G with
respect to r equals the value MP(RTBr(G)).
To the best of our knowledge, there was no natural known connection between bidding games and biased
random turn-based games, i.e., r 6= 0.5. Uniform random turn-based games, i.e., with r = 0.5, have been
extensively studied in the mathematics community. In the seminal work [31], a class of such games called
tug of war games have been used to show the existence of the infinity Laplacian on a large class of sets. The
infinity-laplacian problem is in turn connected to a discrete version of Dirichlet’s problem. In Dirichlet’s
problem one gets a set S and the value of a function f of a subset of S and the goal is to find a continuous
extension of f to S. The infinity Laplacian is similar only that a different local rule on the function is used
rather than continuity.
Reachability games tend to be simpler than mean-payoff games, thus we find the existence of a prob-
abilistic connection in poorman mean-payoff games surprising given the inexistence of such a connection
for poorman reachability games. A corollary of the result is the following connection between poorman and
Richman bidding. It is shown in [5] that the value of a Richman mean-payoff strongly-connected game G
equals the value of the uniform game RTB0.5(G). Thus, the value of G when viewed as a Richman game
equals the value of G when viewed as a poorman game with respect to the initial ratio 0.5. We are not aware
of previous such connections between the two bidding rules.
Finally, we address, for the first time, complexity issues in poorman games; namely, we study the prob-
lem of finding threshold ratios in poorman games. We show that for qualitative games, the corresponding
decision problem is in PSPACE using the existential theory of the reals [11]. For mean-payoff games, the
problem of finding the value of the game with respect to a given ratio is also in PSPACE for general games,
and for strongly-connected games, we show the value can be found in NP and coNP, and even in P for
strongly-connected games with out-degree 2.
Further related work Beyond the works that are directly relevant to us, which we have compared to
above, we list previous work on Richman games. To the best of our knowledge, since their introduction,
poorman games have not been studied. Motivated by recreational games, e.g., bidding chess [8, 25], discrete
bidding games are studied in [17], where the money is divided into chips, so a bid cannot be arbitrarily small
unlike the bidding games we study. Non-zero-sum two-player Richman games were recently studied in [22].
2 Preliminaries
A graph game is played on a directed graphG = 〈V,E〉, where V is a finite set of vertices andE ⊆ V ×V is
a set of edges. The neighbors of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted N(v), is the set of vertices {u ∈ V : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E},
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and we say that G has out-degree 2 if for every v ∈ V , we have |N(v)| = 2. A path in G is a finite or
infinite sequence of vertices v1, v2, . . . such that for every i ≥ 1, we have 〈vi, vi+1〉 ∈ E.
Objectives An objective O is a set of infinite paths. In reachability games, Player 1 has a target vertex
vR and an infinite path is winning for him if it visits vR. In parity games each vertex has a parity index in
{1, . . . , d}, and an infinite path is winning for Player 1 iff the maximal parity index that is visited infinitely
often is odd. We also consider games that are played on a weighted graph 〈V,E,w〉, where w : V → Q.
Consider an infinite path pi = v1, v2, . . .. For n ∈ IN, we use pin to denote the prefix of length n of pi.
We call the sum of weights that pin traverses the energy of the game, denoted E(pin). Thus, E(pin) =∑
1≤j<nw(vj). In energy games, the goal of Player 1 is to keep the energy level positive, thus he wins
an infinite path iff for every n ∈ IN, we have E(pin) > 0. Unlike the previous objectives, a path in a
mean-payoff game is associated with a payoff, which is Player 1’s reward and Player 2’s cost. Accordingly,
in mean-payoff games, we refer to Player 1 as Min and Player 2 as Max. We define the payoff of pi to
be lim infn→∞ 1nE(pi
n). We say that Max wins an infinite path of a mean-payoff game if the payoff is
non-negative.
Strategies and plays A strategy prescribes to a player which action to take in a game, given a finite history
of the game, where we define these two notions below. For example, in turn-based games, a strategy takes as
input, the sequence of vertices that were visited so far, and it outputs the next vertex to move to. In bidding
games, histories and strategies are more complicated as they maintain the information about the bids and
winners of the bids. Formally, a history is a sequence τ = v0, 〈v1, b1, `1〉, 〈v2, b2, `2〉, . . . , 〈vk, bk, `k〉 ∈
V · (V × IR× {1, 2})∗, where, for j ≥ 1, in the j-th round, the token is placed on vertex vj−1, the winning
bid is bj , and the winner is Player `j , and Player `j moves the token to vertex vj . A strategy prescribes
an action 〈b, v〉, where b is a bid that does not exceed the available budget and v is a vertex to move to
upon winning. The winner of the bidding is the player who bids higher, where we assume there is some
mechanism to resolve draws, and our results are not affected by what the mechanism is. More formally,
for i ∈ {1, 2}, let Bi be the initial budgets of Player i, and, for a finite history pi, let Wi(pi) be the sum
of Player i winning bids throughout pi. In Richman bidding, the winner of a bidding pays the loser, thus
Player 1’s budget following pi is B1 −W1 + W2. In poorman bidding, the winner pays the “bank”, thus
Player 1’s budget following pi is B1−W1. Note that in poorman bidding, the loser’s budget does not change
following a bidding. An initial vertex together with two strategies for the players determine a unique infinite
play pi for the game. The vertices that pi visits form an infinite path path(pi). Player 1 wins pi according to
an objective O iff path(pi) ∈ O. We call a strategy f winning for Player 1 if for every strategy g of Player 2
the play they determine satisfies O. Winning strategies for Player 2 are defined dually.
Definition 2. (Initial ratio) Suppose the initial budget of Player i is Bi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the total initial
budget is B = B1 +B2 and Player i’s initial ratio is Bi/B. We assume B > 0.
The first question that arrises in the context of bidding games asks what is the necessary and sufficient
initial ratio to guarantee an objective. We generalize the definition in [26, 27]:
Definition 3. (Threshold ratios) Consider a poorman or Richman game G, a vertex v, and an initial ratio r
and objective O for Player 1. The threshold ratio in v, denoted Th(v), is a ratio in [0, 1] such that
• if r > Th(v), then Player 1 has a winning strategy that guarantees O is satisfied, and
• if r < Th(v), then Player 2 has a winning strategy that violates O.
Recall that we say that Max wins a mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 if the mean-payoff value is non-
negative. Finding Th(v) for a vertex v in G thus answers the question of what is the minimal ratio of the
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initial budget that guarantees winning. A more refined question asks what is the optimal payoff Max can
guarantee with an initial ratio r. Formally, for a constant c ∈ Q, let Gc be the mean-payoff game that is
obtained from G by decreasing all weights by c.
Definition 4. (Mean-payoff values) Consider a mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1].
The value of G with respect to c, denoted MPr(G, v), is such that Th(v) = r in Gc.
Random turn-based games In a stochastic game the vertices of the graph are partitioned between two
players and a nature player. As in turn-based games, whenever the game reaches a vertex of Player i, for
i = 1, 2, he choses how the game proceeds, and whenever the game reaches a vertex v that is controlled by
nature, the next vertex is chosen according to a probability distribution that depends only on v.
Consider a game G = 〈V,E〉. The random-turn based game with ratio r ∈ [0, 1] that is associated with G
is a stochastic game that intuitively simulates the fact that Player 1 chooses the next move with probability r
and Player 2 chooses with probability 1− r. Formally, we define RTBr(G) = 〈V1, V2, VN , E,Pr, w〉, where
each vertex in V is split into three vertices, each controlled by a different player, thus for α ∈ {1, 2, N},
we have Vα = {vα : v ∈ V }, nature vertices simulate the fact that Player 1 chooses the next move with
probability r, thus Pr[vN , v1] = r = 1 − Pr[vN , v2], and reaching a vertex that is controlled by one of the
two players means that he chooses the next move, thus E = {〈vα, uN 〉 : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E and α ∈ {1, 2}}. When
G is weighted, then the weights of v1, v2, and vN equal that of v.
Fixing two strategies f and g for the two players in a stochastic game results in a Markov chain, which
in turn gives rise to a probability distribution D(f, g) over infinite sequences of vertices. A strategy f is
optimal w.r.t. an objectiveO if it maximizes supf infg Prpi∼D(f,g)[pi ∈ O]. For the objectives we consider, it
is well-known that optimal strategies exist, which are, in fact, positional; namely, strategies that only depend
on the current position of the game and not on its history.
Definition 5. (Values) Let r ∈ [0, 1]. For a qualitative game G, the value of RTBr(G), denoted val(RTBr(G)),
is the probability that Player 1 wins when he plays optimally. For a mean-payoff game G, the mean-payoff
value of RTBr(G), denoted MP(RTBr(G)), is the maximal expected payoff Max obtains when he plays opti-
mally.
3 Poorman Parity Games
For qualitative objectives, poorman games have mostly similar properties to the corresponding Richman
games. We start with reachability objectives, which were studied in [27, 26]. The objective they study
is slightly different than ours. We call their objective double-reachability: both players have targets and
the game ends once one of the targets is reached. As we show below, for our purposes, the variants are
equivalent since there are no draws in finite-state poorman and Richman double-reachability games.
Consider a double-reachability game G = 〈V,E, u1, u2〉, where, for i = 1, 2, the target of Player i is
ui. In both Richman and poorman bidding, trivially Player 1 wins in u1 with any initial budget and Player 2
wins in u2 with any initial budget, thus Th(u1) = 0 and Th(u2) = 1. For v ∈ V , let v+, v− ∈ N(v) be
such that, for every v′ ∈ N(v), we have Th(v−) ≤ Th(v′) ≤ Th(v+).
Theorem 6. [27, 26] Threshold ratios exist in Richman and poorman reachability games. Moreover, con-
sider a double-reachability game G = 〈V,E, u1, u2〉.
• In Richman bidding, for v ∈ V \ {u1, u2}, we have Th(v) = 12
(
Th(v+) + Th(v−)
)
, and it follows
that Th(v) = val(RTB0.5(G, v)) and that Th(v) is a rational number.
• In poorman bidding, for v ∈ V \{u1, u2}, we have Th(v) = Th(v+)/
(
1−Th(v−)+Th(v+)). There
is a game G and a vertex v with an irrational Th(v).
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Proof. The proof here is similar to [26] and is included for completeness, with a slight difference: unlike
[26], we consider games in which one of the targets is not reachable. The Richman case is irrelevant for us
and we leave it out.
Consider a poorman double-reachability game G = 〈V,E, u1, u2〉. It is shown in [26] that there exists a
unique function f : V → [0, 1] that satisfies the following conditions: we have f(u1) = 0 and f(u2) = 1,
and for every v ∈ V , we have f(v) = f(v+)
1+f(v+)−f(v−) , where v
+, v− ∈ N(v) are the neighbors of v that
respectively maximize and minimize f , i.e., for every v′ ∈ N(v), we have f(v−) ≤ f(v′) ≤ f(v+).
We claim that for every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = f(v). Our argument will be for Player 1 and duality
gives an argument for Player 2. Suppose Player 1’s budget is f(v) +  and Player 2’s budget is 1− f(v), for
some  > 0. Note that we implicitly assume that f(v) < 1. In case f(v) = 1 we do not show anything, but
still, our dual strategy for Player 2 ensures that u2 is visited, when the initial budget for Player 2 is positive.
We describe a Player 1 strategy that forces the game to u1.
Similar to [26], we divide Player 1’s budget ratio into his real budget and a slush fund. We will ensure
the following invariants:
1. Whenever we are in state v, if x is Player 1’s real budget and y is Player 2’s budget, then f(v) =
x/(x+ y).
2. Every time Player 2 wins a bidding the slush fund increases by a constant factor. Formally, there exists
a constant c > 1, such that when 0 is the initial slush fund and i is the slush fund after Player 2 wins
for the i-th time, we have that i > c · i−1, for all i ≥ 1.
Note that these invariants are satisfied initially.
We describe a Player 1 strategy. Consider a round in vertex v in which Player 1’s real budget is x′,
Player 2’s budget is y′ and the last time Player 2 won (or initially, in case Player 2 has not won yet) his slush
fund was ′. Player 1’s bid is ∆(v) ·x′+δv · ′, where we define ∆(v) and δv below. Upon winning, Player 1
moves to v−, i.e., to the neighbor that minimizes f(v), or, when f(v) = 0, he moves to a vertex closer to
u1. Upon winning, Player 1 pays ∆(v) · x′ from his real budget and δv · ′ from his slush fund.
For v ∈ V \ {u1, u2}, if f(v) > 0 and f(v−) < 1, let ∆(v) = f(v)−f(v
−)
f(v)(1−f(v−)) and otherwise, let
∆(v) = 0. In App. A we choose δv, for v ∈ V , and show that our choice implies that Player 1’s strategy
maintains the invariant above. Note that the second invariant indicates that Player 2 cannot win more than
a finite number of times, since whenever he wins, the slush fund increases by a constant and the slush fund
cannot exceed 1, because then it would be bigger than the total budget. This in turn shows that eventually
Player 1 wins n times in a row, which ensures that the play reaches u1.
We show existence of threshold budgets in a poorman reachability game G = 〈V,E, u1〉. Let S ⊆ V be
the set of vertices that have no path to u1. Clearly, for v ∈ S, we have Th(v) = 1. Let G′ = 〈V ′, E′, u1, u2〉
be the double-reachability game that is obtained from G by setting V ′ = V \S and Player 2’s target u2 to be
a vertex in S. For v ∈ V ′, we claim that Th(v) in G′ equals Th(v) in G. Indeed, if Player 1’s ratio exceeds
Th(v) he can draw the game to u1 and if Player 2’s ratio exceeds 1− Th(v) he can draw the game to S.
Finally, we describe a poorman double-reachability game G with irrational threshold budgets. The
vertices are u1, v1, v2, and u2, and the edges are u1 ← v1 ↔ v2 → u2. Solving the equation above we get
Th(v1) = (
√
5− 1)/2 and Th(v2) = (3−
√
5)/2.
We continue to study poorman games with richer objectives.
Theorem 7. Poorman parity games are linearly reducible to poorman reachability games. Specifically,
threshold ratios exist in poorman parity games.
Proof. The crux of the proof is to show that in a bottom strongly-connected component (BSCC, for short)
of G, one of the players wins with every initial budget. Thus, the threshold ratios for vertices in BSCCs are
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either 0 or 1. For the rest of the vertices, we construct a reachability game in which a player’s goal is to
reach a BSCC that is “winning” for him.
Formally, consider a strongly-connected poorman parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉. We claim that there is
α ∈ {0, 1} such that for every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = α, i.e., when α = 0, Player 1 wins with any
positive initial budget, and similarly for α = 1. Moreover, deciding which is the case is easy: let vMax ∈ V
be the vertex with maximal parity index, then α = 0 iff p(vMax) is odd.
Suppose p(vMax) is odd and the proof for an even p(vMax) is dual. We prove in two steps. First,
following the proof of Theorem 6, we have that when Player 1’s initial budget is  > 0, he can draw the
game to vMax once. Second, we show that Player 1 can reach vMax infinitely often when his initial budget
is  > 0. Player 1 splits his budget into parts 1, 2, . . ., where i =  · 2−i, for i ≥ 1, thus
∑
i≥1 i = .
Then, for i ≥ 0, following the i-th visit to vMax, he plays the strategy necessary to draw the game to vMax
with initial budget i+1.
We turn to show the reduction from poorman parity games to poorman double-reachability games. Con-
sider a poorman parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉. Let S ⊆ V be a BSCC in G. We call S winning for Player 1 if
the vertex vMax with highest parity index in S has odd p(vMax). Dually, we call S winning for Player 2 if
p(vMax) is even. Indeed, the claim above implies that for every S that is winning for Player 1 and v ∈ S,
we have Th(v) = 0, and dually for Player 2. Let G′ be a poorman double-reachability game that is obtained
from G by setting the BSCCs that are winning for Player 1 in G to be his target in G′ and the BSCCs that are
winning for Player 2 in G to be his target in G′. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6, we have that Th(v) in G
equals Th(v) in G′, and we are done.
4 Poorman Mean-Payoff Games
This section consists of our most technically challenging contribution. We construct optimal strategies for
the players in poorman mean-payoff games. The crux of the solution regards strongly-connected mean-
payoff games, which we develop in the first three sub-sections.
Consider a strongly-connected game G and an initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. We claim that the value in G w.r.t. r
does not depend on the initial vertex. For a vertex v in G, recall that MPr(G, v) is the maximal payoff Max
can guarantee when his initial ratio in v is r + , for every  > 0. We claim that for every vertex u 6= v in
G, we have MPr(G, u) = MPr(G, v). Indeed, as in Theorem 7, Max can play as if his initial ratio is /2 and
draw the game from u to v, and from there play using an initial ratio of r + /2. Since the energy that is
accumulated until reaching v is constant, it does not affect the payoff of the infinite play starting from v.
We write MPr(G) to denote the value of G w.r.t. r. We show the following probabilistic connection:
the value MPr(G) equals the value MP(RTBr(G)) of the random turn-based mean-payoff game RTBr(G) in
which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1− r.
4.1 Warm up: solving a simple game
In this section we solve a simple game through which we demonstrate the ideas of the general case. Recall
that in an energy game, Min wins a finite play if the sum of weights it traverses, a.k.a. the energy, is 0 and
Max wins an infinite play in which the energy stays positive throughout the play. Consider the game depicted
in Fig. 1 and view the game as an energy game. It is shown in [26] that if the initial energy is k ∈ IN, then
Max wins iff his initial ratio exceeds k+22k+2 . We describe an alternative proof for the first implication.
We need several definitions. For k ∈ IN, let Sk be the square of area k2. In Fig. 3, we depict S5. We
split Sk into unit-area boxes such that each of its sides contains k boxes. A diagonal in Sk splits it into a
smaller black triangle and a larger white one. For k ∈ IN, we respectively denote by tk and Tk the areas of
the smaller black triangle and the larger white triangle of Sk. For example, we have t5 = 10 and T5 = 15,
and in general tk =
k(k−1)
2 and Tk =
k(k+1)
2 .
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2 3 4 5 6
tk 1 3 6 10 15
Tk 3 6 10 15 21
. . .
Figure 3: The square S5 with area 25 and the sizes of some triangles.
Suppose the game starts with energy κ ∈ IN. We show that Max wins when his ratio exceeds κ+22κ+2 ,
which equals Tκ+1
(κ+1)2
. For ease of presentation, it is convenient to assume that the players’ ratios add up to
1 + 0, Max’s initial ratio is
Tκ+1
(κ+1)2
+ 0, and Min’s initial ratio is
tκ+1
(κ+1)2
. For j ≥ 0, we think of j as Max’s
slush fund in the j-th round of the game, though its role here is somewhat less significant than in Theorem 6.
Consider a play pi. We think of changes in energy throughout pi and changes in budget ratio as representing
two walks on two sequences. The energy sequence is IN and the budget sequence is {tk/Sk : k ∈ IN}, with
the natural order in the two sets. We show a strategy for Max that maintains the invariant that whenever the
energy is k ∈ IN, then Max’s ratio is greater than Tk+1/(k + 1)2. That is, whenever Max wins a bidding,
both sequences take a “step up” and when he loses, both sequences take a “step down”.
We describe Max’s strategy. Upon winning a bidding, Max chooses the +1 edge and we assume Min
chooses the −1 edge. The challenge is to find the right bids. Suppose the energy level is k at the j-th round.
Thus, Max and Min’s ratio are respectively Tk+1/(k + 1)2 + j and tk+1/(k + 1)2. In other words, Min
owns tk+1 boxes and Max owns a bit more than Tk+1 boxes. Max’s bid consists of two parts. Max bids
1/(k+ 1)2 + j/2, or in other words, a single box and half of his slush fund. We first show how the strategy
maintains the invariant and then how it guarantees that an energy of 0 is never reached. Suppose first that
Max wins the bidding. The total number of boxes decreases by one to (k + 1)2 − 1, his slush fund is cut by
half, and Min’s budget is unchanged. Thus, Max’s ratio of the budget is more than (Tk+1−1)/
(
(k+1)2−1),
which equals Tk+2/(k+2)2. In other words, after normalization, Max owns more than Tk+2 boxes and Min
owns tk+2 boxes; the budget sequence takes a step up, matching the increase of 1 in the energy. The other
case is when Min wins the bidding, the energy decreases by 1, and we show that the budget sequences takes
a step down. Since Max bids more than one box, Min overbids, and in the worst case, he bids 1 box. Max’s
new ratio is more than Tk+1/((k+ 1)2− 1) = Tk/k2. For example, let k = 4. Following a Max win, Max’s
ratio is T5−1t5+T5−1 =
15−1
25−1 =
21
36 =
T6
t6+T6
and upon losing, Max’s ratio is 1525−1 =
10
16 =
T4
t4+T4
.
We conclude by showing that the energy never reaches 0 by showing that the walk on the budget se-
quence never reaches the first element. Suppose the energy is k = 1 in the j-th round, thus according to the
invariant, Max’s ratio is 34 + j and Min’s ratio is
1
4 . Recall that Max bids
1
(k+1)2
+ j/2 at energy k, thus he
bids 14 + j/2 at energy 1, and necessarily wins the bidding, implying that the energy increases.
4.2 Defining a richer budget sequence
The game studied in the previous section is very simple. In this section we generalize the budget sequence
that is used there so that we can handle arbitrary strongly-connected graphs. We proceed in two steps. Note
that the budget sequence that is used in the previous section tends to 0.5 as the initial energy increases. It
can thus be used for an initial ratio r = 0.5. The first generalization allows us to deal with r 6= 0.5. Recall
the geometric intuition in the previous section. For some k ∈ IN, Min owns the smaller black triangle tk
and Max’s owns the larger white triangle Tk. The total area of the square is tk + Tk. Let µ, ν ∈ Q>0. We
generalize the sequence by setting Min’s budget to be µ black triangles and Max’s budget to be ν white
triangles. The total budget, or area, is thus µ · tk + ν · Tk and Max’s initial ratio is r = ν·Tkν·Tk+µ·tk . For
example, set k = 5, µ = 2, and ν = 3. Then, Min has 2 · t5 = 2 · 10 boxes and Max has 3 · T5 = 3 · 15
boxes. It is nice to note the following property, which can of course be generalized: a Min win with a bid of
2 results in a step down, indeed 3T52t5+3T5−2 =
3·15
2·10+3·15−2 =
3·T4
2·t4+3·T4 , and a Max win with a bid of 3 results
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in a step up, indeed 3·T5−32·t5+3·T5−3 =
3·T6
2·t6+3·T6 .
We make a second generalization. Rather than restricting to a discrete domain in which k gets values in
IN, we replace k with a variable x whose domain is the real numbers. We define a functionRr : IR→ IR by
Rr(x) = ν·Txµ·tx+ν·Tx . Note that limx→∞Rr(x) = νµ+ν , and that the limit is reached from above.
We describe the intuition of how the following lemma is used. A play is going to induce a walk on a
budget sequence B ⊆ IR. Max’s strategy will ensure that whenever the walk reaches x ∈ B, Max’s ratio is
greater than Rr(x). In the first part of the lemma Min bids µ · y, wins the bidding, and the walk proceeds
down y steps. In the second part, Max bids ν · y, wins the bidding, and the walk proceeds up y steps. The
proof can be found in App. B.
Lemma 8. Consider µ, ν ∈ Q>0 and 0 < y ≤ 1 such that µ > ν ·y when ν > µ and ν > µ ·y when µ > ν.
Then, for every x ≥ 1 both of the following hold
ν · Tx
µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y ≤
ν · Tx−y
µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y and
ν · Tx − ν · y
µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y ≤
ν · Tx+y
µ · tx+y + ν · Tx+y
4.3 The potential and strength of vertices
In an arbitrary strongly-connected game the bids in the different vertices cannot be the same. In this section
we develop a technique to determine the “importance” of a node v, which we call its strength and measures
how high the bid should be in v compared with the other nodes.
Consider a strongly-connected game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that RTBr(G) is a random-
turn based game in which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1− r. A
positional strategy is a strategy that always chooses the same action (edge) in a vertex. It is well known that
there exist optimal positional strategies for both players in stochastic mean-payoff games.
Consider two optimal positional strategies f and g in RTBr(G), for Min and Max, respectively. For
a vertex v ∈ V , let v−, v+ ∈ V be such that f(vMin) = v− and g(vMax) = v+. The potential of v,
denoted Potr(v), is a known concept in probabilistic models and its existence is guaranteed [33]. We use
the potential to define the strength of v, denoted Str(v), which intuitively measures how much the potentials
of the neighbors of v differ. We assume w.l.o.g. that MP(RTBr(G)) = 0 as otherwise we can decrease all
weights by this value. Let r = νν+µ . The potential and strengths of v are functions that satisfy the following:
Potr(v) =
ν · Potr(v+) + µ · Potr(v−)
µ+ ν
+ w(v) and Str(v) = νµ · Pot
r(v+)− Potr(v−)
µ+ ν
There are optimal strategies for which Potr(v−) ≤ Potr(v′) ≤ Potr(v+), for every v′ ∈ N(v), which can
be found for example using the strategy iteration algorithm.
Consider a finite path pi = v1, . . . , vn in G. We intuitively think of pi as a play, where for every 1 ≤ i < n,
the bid of Max in vi is St(vi) and he moves to v+i upon winning. Thus, if vi+1 = v
+
i , we say that Max won
in vi, and if vi+1 6= v+i , we say that Max lost in vi. Let W (pi) and L(pi) respectively be the indices in
which Max wins and loses in pi. We call Max wins investments and Max loses gains, where intuitively he
invests in increasing the energy and gains a higher ratio of the budget whenever the energy decreases. Let
G(pi) and I(pi) be the sum of gains and investments in pi, respectively, thus G(pi) =
∑
i∈L(pi) St(vi) and
I(pi) =
∑
i∈W (pi) St(vi). Recall that the energy of pi is E(pi) =
∑
1≤i<nw(vi). The following lemma
connects the strength, potential, and energy.
Lemma 9. Consider a strongly-connected game G, a ratio r = νµ+ν ∈ (0, 1) such that MP(RTBr(G)) = 0,
and a finite path pi in G from v to u. Then, Potr(v)− Potr(u) ≤ E(pi) +G(pi)/µ− I(pi)/ν.
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Proof. We prove by induction on the length of pi. For n = 1, the claim is trivial since both sides of the
equation are 0. Suppose the claim is true for paths of length n and we prove for paths of length n + 1. We
distinguish between two cases. In the first case, Max wins in v, thus the second vertex in pi is v+. The case
where Min wins is proven similarly. Let pi′ be the prefix of pi starting from v+. Note that since Max wins
the first bidding, we have G(pi) = G(pi′) and I(pi) = St(v) + I(pi′). Also, we have E(pi) = E(pi′) + w(v).
Combining these, we have E(pi) + G(pi)µ − I(pi)ν = E′(pi) +w(v) + G(pi
′)
µ − I(pi
′)
ν − St(v)ν . By the induction
hypothesis, we have Potr(v+)−Potr(u) ≤ E(pi′)+G(pi′)/µ−I(pi′)/ν. Combining these with the definition
of St(v), we have the following.
E(pi) +
G(pi)
µ
− I(pi)
ν
≥ −St(v)
ν
+ Potr(v+) + w(v)− Potr(u) =
= µ · −Pot
r(v+) + Potr(v−)
µ+ ν
+ Potr(v+) + w(v)− Potr(u) =
= Potr(v)− Potr(u)
Example 10. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 2. Max always proceeds left and Min always proceeds
right, so, for example, we have v+2 = v1 and v
−
2 = v3 We have P
2
3 (v1) = 6, P
2
3 (v2) = 3, P
2
3 (v3) = 0, and
P
2
3 (v4) = −3. Thus, the strengths are St(v1) = 2, St(v2) = 4, St(v3) = 4, and St(v4) = 2. Consider the
path pi = v0, v1, v2, v2, v1, v0 in which Max wins the first three bids and loses the last two, thusG(pi) = 2+4
and I(pi) = 4 + 4 + 2 = 10. We have E(pi) = −1 since the last vertex does not contribute to the energy.
The left-hand side of the expression in Lemma 9 is 0, and the right-hand side is −1 + 6/1− 10/2 = 0.
4.4 Putting it all together
In this section we combine the ingredients developed in the previous sections to solve arbitrary strongly-
connected mean-payoff games.
Theorem 11. Consider a strongly-connected poorman mean-payoff game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. The
value of G with respect to r equals the value of the random-turn based mean-payoff game RTBr(G) in which
Max chooses the next move with probability r, thus MPr(G) = MP(RTBr(G)).
Proof. We assume w.l.o.g. that MP(RTBr(G)) = 0 since otherwise we decrease this value from all weights.
Also, the case where r ∈ {0, 1} is easy since RTBr(G) is a graph and in G, one of the players can win all
biddings. Thus, we assume r ∈ (0, 1). Recall that MP(pi) = lim infn→∞ E(pi
n)
n . We show a Max strategy
that, when the game starts from a vertex v ∈ V and with an initial ratio of r + , guarantees that the energy
is bounded below by a constant, which implies MP(pi) ≥ 0.
Note that showing such a strategy for Max suffices to prove MPr(G) = 0 since our definition for a payoff
favors Min. Consider the game G′ that is obtained from G by multiplying all weights by −1. We have
MP(RTBr(G′)) = −MP(RTBr(G)) = 0. Associate Min in G with Max in G′, thus an initial ratio of r − 
for Min in G is associated with an initial ratio of r +  of Max in G′. Let f be a Max strategy in G′ that
guarantees a non-negative payoff. Suppose Min plays in G according to f and let pi be a play when Max
plays some strategy. Since f guarantees a non-negative payoff in G′, we have lim supn→∞E(pin)/n ≤ 0 in
G, and in particular MP(pi) = lim infn→∞E(pin)/n ≤ 0.
Before we describe Max’s strategy, we need several definitions. Let S = maxv∈V |St(v)| and r = νν+µ .
We choose 0 < β ≤ 1 such that β · ν · S < 1 and β · µ · ν · S < µν . Let B = {β · i : i ∈ IN}. We choose
x0 ∈ B such that Max’s ratio is greater thanRr(x0), which is possible sinceRr tends to 1− r from above.
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Suppose Max is playing according to the strategy we describe below and Min is playing according to some
strategy. The play induces a walk on B, which we refer to as the budget walk. Max’s strategy guarantees
the following:
Invariant: Whenever the budget walk reaches an x ∈ B, then Max’s ratio is greater thanRr(x).
The walk starts in x0 and the invariant holds initially due to our choice of x0. Suppose the token is
placed on the vertex v ∈ V and the walk reaches x. Max bids St(v) · β · µ · ν · (Dr(x))−1, where Dr(x)
is the denominator of Rr(x), and he moves to v+ upon winning. If Max loses, the walk proceeds down
to x − ν · St(v) · β, and by Lemma 8, the invariant is maintained. If Max wins, the walk proceeds up to
x+ µ · St(v) · β, and by the other part of Lemma 8, and the invariant is maintained.
Claim: For every Min strategy, the budget walk never reaches x = 1.
Recall that S is the maximal strength of a vertex. The largest step down on the budget sequence following
a Min win is at most β ·S ·ν. Thus, before crossing 1, the walk must visit 1+k ·β, for some 1 ≤ k ≤ S ·ν+1.
Suppose the walk visits x = 1 + k · β at vertex v ∈ V with St(v) · ν > k. Thus, if Min wins the bidding,
the walk crosses 1. We claim that Max wins the bidding. Let z = St(v) · ν · β. Recall that Max’s bid at v is
µ·z
D(x) and that Max’s ratio is greater than Rr(x), thus Min’s ratio is less than 1 −Rr(x) ≤ µ·z(z−1)/2D(x) . For
every 0 < z < 1, we have z > z(z−1)2 , and our choice of β implies that indeed 0 < z < 1. Thus, Max’s bid
exceeds Min’s budget, so he wins the bidding, and we are done.
Claim: The energy throughout a play is bounded from below. Formally, there exists a constant c ∈ IR such
that for every Min strategy and a finite play pi, we have E(pi) ≥ c.
Consider a finite play pi. We view pi as a sequence of vertices in G. Recall that the budget walk starts
at x0, and that G(pi) and I(pi) represent sums of strength of vertices. Suppose the budget walk reaches x
following the play pi, then x = x0 − G(pi) · ν · β + I(pi) · µ · β. Recall that for every v ∈ V , we have
St(v) ≥ −S. Rephrasing Lemma 9, we have −G(pi)·ν+I(pi)·µν·µ ≤ 2S + E(pi). Thus, x−x0βµν ≤ 2S + E(pi). By
the claim above x ≥ 1. It follows that 1−x0βµν − 2S ≤ E(pi), and we are done.
Remark 12. An interesting connection between poorman and Richman biddings arrises from Theorem 11.
Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G. For an initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1], let MPrP(G) denote the
value of G with respect to r with poorman bidding. In [5], the authors show that the value with Rich-
man bidding does not depend on r, thus we denote it by MPR(G). Moreover, they show a probabilis-
tic connection: MPR(G) equals the value in the RTB in which the players are selected uniformly, thus
MPR(G) = MP(RTB0.5(G)). Our results show that poorman games with initial ratio 0.5 coincide with Rich-
man games. Indeed, we have MPR(G) = MP0.5P (G). To the best of our knowledge such a connection between
the two bidding rules has not been identified before.
Remark 13. The proof technique in Theorem 11 extends to poorman energy games. Consider a strongly-
connected mean-payoff game G, and let r ∈ [0, 1] such that MPr(G) = 0. Now, view G as a poorman energy
game. The proof of Theorem 11 shows that when Max’s initial ratio is r + , there exists an initial energy
level from which he can win the game. On the other hand, when Max’s initial ratio is r− , Min can win the
energy game from every initial energy. Indeed, consider the game G′ that is obtained from G by multiplying
all weights by −1. Again, using Theorem 11 and associating Min with Max, Min can keep the energy level
bounded from above, which allows him, similar to the qualitative case, to play a strategy in which he either
wins or increases his ratio by a constant. Eventually, his ratio is high enough to win arbitrarily many times
in a row and drop the energy as low as required.
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4.5 Extention to general mean-payoff games
We extend the solution in the previous sections to general graphs in a similar manner to the qualitative case;
we first reason about the BSCCs of the graph and then construct an appropriate reachability game on the
rest of the vertices. Recall that, for a vertex v in a mean-payoff game, the ratio Th(v) is a necessary and
sufficient initial ratio to guarantee a payoff of 0.
Consider a poorman mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉. Recall that, for v ∈ V , Th(v) is the necessary
and sufficient initial ratio for Max to guarantee a non-positive payoff. Let S1, . . . , Sk ⊆ V be the BSCCs
of G and S = ⋃1≤i≤k Si. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the poorman mean-payoff game Gi = 〈Si, E|Si , w|Si〉 is a
strongly-connected game. We define ri ∈ [0, 1] as follows. If there is an r ∈ [0, 1] such that MPr(Gi) = 0,
then ri = r. Otherwise, if for every r, we have MPr(Gi) > 0, then ri = 0, and if for every r, we have
MPr(Gi) < 0, then ri = 1. By Theorem 11, for every v ∈ Si, we have Th(v) = ri. We construct a
generalized reachability game G′ that corresponds to G by replacing every Si in G with a vertex ui. Player 1
wins a path in G iff it visits some ui and when it visits ui, Player 1’s ratio is at least ri. It is not hard to
generalize the proof of Theorem 6 to generalized reachability poorman games and obtain the following.
Theorem 14. The threshold ratios in a poorman mean-payoff game G coincide with the threshold ratios in
the generalized reachability game that corresponds to G.
5 Computational Complexity
We study the complexity of finding the threshold ratios in poorman games. We formalize this search problem
as the following decision problem. Recall that threshold ratios in poorman reachability games may be
irrational (see Theorem 6).
THRESH-BUD Given a bidding game G, a vertex v, and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, decide whether Th(v) ≥ r.
Theorem 15. For poorman parity games, THRESH-BUD is in PSPACE.
Proof. To show membership in PSPACE, we guess the optimal moves for the two players. To verify the
guess, we construct a program of the existential theory of the reals that uses the relation between the thresh-
old ratios that is described in Theorem 6. Deciding whether such a program has a solution is known to be
in PSPACE [11]. Formally, given a poorman parity game G = 〈V,E, p〉 and a vertex v ∈ V , we guess,
for each vertex u ∈ V , two neighbors u+, u− ∈ N(u). We construct the following program. For every
vertex u ∈ V , we introduce a variable xu, and we add constraints so that a satisfying assignment to xu
coincides with the threshold ratio in u. Consider a BSCC S of G. Recall that the threshold ratios in S are
all either 0 or 1, and verifying which is the case can be done in linear time. Suppose the threshold ratios are
α ∈ {0, 1}. We add constraints xu = α, for every u ∈ S. For every vertex u ∈ V that is not in a BSCC,
we have constraints xu =
xu+
1−xu−+xu+ and xu− ≤ xu′ ≤ xu+ , for every u
′ ∈ N(u). By Theorems 6 and 7,
a satisfying assignment assigns to xu the ratio Th(u). We conclude by adding a final constraint xv ≥ r.
Clearly, the program has a satisfying assignment iff Th(v) ≥ r, and we are done.
We continue to study mean-payoff games.
Theorem 16. For poorman mean-payoff games, THRESH-BUD is in PSPACE. For strongly-connected
games, it is in NP and coNP. For strongly-connected games with out-degree 2, THRESH-BUD is in P.
Proof. To show membership in PSPACE, we proceed similarly to the qualitative case, and show a nondeter-
ministic polynomial-space that uses the existential theory of the reals to verify its guess. Given a game G, we
construct a program that finds, for each BSCC S of G, the threshold ratio for all the vertices in V . We then
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extend the program to propagate the threshold ratios to the rest of the vertices, similar to Theorem 14. Given
a strongly-connected game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1], we construct RTBr(G) in linear time. Then, deciding
whether MP(RTBr(G)) ≥ 0, is known to be in NP and coNP.
The more challenging case is the solution for strongly-connected games with out-degree 2. Consider
such a game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and r ∈ [0, 1]. We construct an MDP D on the structure of G such that
MP(D) = MPr(G). Since finding MP(D) is known to be in P, the claim follows. When r ≥ 12 , then D is a
max-MDP, and when r < 12 , it is a min-MDP. Assume the first case, and the second case is similar. We split
every vertex v ∈ V in three, where v ∈ VMax and v1, v2 ∈ VN . Suppose {u1, u2} = N(v). Intuitively,
moving to v1 means that Max prefers moving to u1 over u2. Thus, we have Pr[v1, u1] = r = 1−Pr[v1, u2]
and Pr[v2, u1] = 1− r = 1− Pr[v2, u2]. It is not hard to see that MP(D) = MPr(G).
6 Discussion
We studied for the first time infinite-duration poorman bidding games. We show the existence of threshold
ratios for poorman games with qualitative objectives and give, to the best of our knowledge, the first com-
plexity upper bounds on finding threshold ratios. For poorman mean-payoff games, we construct optimal
strategies with respect to the initial ratio of the budgets and show an interesting probabilistic connection for
these games.
Historically, poorman bidding has been studied less than Richman bidding, but the reason was technical
difficulty, not lack of motivation. On the contrary, we believe that poorman bidding is as motivated as
Richman bidding, if not more so, particularly since they are easier to generalize. Poorman bidding has been
less approachable since, e.g., poorman reachability games do not necessarily have rational threshold ratios.
We expect that the structure we find here, namely the probabilistic connection for poorman bidding, will
make these game more approachable and assist in introducing concepts like multiple-players, recharging
stations, and partial information to bidding games, which are hard to add to Richman bidding.
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of formal verifi-
cation and algorithmic game theory [30], two fields with a different take on game theory and with comple-
mentary needs. For example, formal reasoning about multi-agent safety critical systems, e.g., components
of an autonomous car, requires insights on rationality. On the other side, formally verifying the correctness
of auctions or reasoning about ongoing auctions, are both challenges that can benefit from the experience
of the formal methods community. Examples of works in the intersection of the two fields include logics
for specifying multi-agent systems [2, 14, 29], studies of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair
problems [13, 12, 19, 1], non-zero-sum games in formal verification [15, 9], and applying concepts from
formal methods to resource allocation games such as rich specifications [7], efficient reasoning about very
large games [4, 24], and a dynamic selection of resources [6].
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A Proof of Theorem 6
Let ∆min be the smallest positive number such that f(v) = ∆min for some v, and ∆min = 1 if f(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
Let δ1 be 1 and δi be such that
i−1∑
j=1
δj < ∆min/2δi ,
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , |V |}. Also, let γ be such that ∑|V |j=1 δj < 1/γ. For each state v (such that f(v) > 0), consider
that Player 1 wins all bids and let dist(v) be the number of bids before the play ends up in u1 starting from v. When
f(v) = 0, let dist(v) be the length of the shortest path from v to u1. Then, δv = γδi, for i = |V | − dist(v).
In case Player 1 wins, his real budget becomes x′−∆(v)x′, and Player 2’s budget stays y′. In that case, Player 1’s
new real budget ratio becomes (1−∆(v))x
′
(1−∆(v))x′+y′ = f(v
−), and the invariants are thus satisfied. (His slush fund also
decreases by δv′. We will not proof anything about the slush fund in this case, except noting that it stays positive).
In case Player 2 wins, Player 1’s real budget stays x′ and Player 2’s budget is at most y′ − ∆(v)x′ − δv′.
By construction, we have that if Player 2’s budget became y′ − ∆(v)x′, then Player 1’s budget ratio becomes
x′
x′+y′−∆(v)x′ = f(v
+), so even if Player 2 moves to v+, Player 2 has paid δv′ too much for Player 1’s real bud-
get ratio to be f(v+). Thus, the first invariant is satisfied. Note that this also indicates that f(v+) 6= 1, in this
case, since otherwise Player 1’s budget ratio must be above 1, indicating that Player 2’s budget is negative. When
f(v+) > 0, we can move δv′f(v+)/(1 − f(v+)) ≥ δv′∆min into the slush fund. When f(v+) = 0, the new slush
fund is δv′. Let j be such that δj = δv . By construction of δv , we have that since the last time Player 2 won a bidding
(or since the start if Player 2 never won a bid before), we have subtracted at most ′
∑|V |
i=j+1 δi from the slush fond and
now we have added δj′∆min. But δi was chosen such that
∑|V |
i=j+1 δi was below δv∆min/2. Hence, we have added
δv
′∆min to the previous content of ′. Because δv and ∆min are constants, we have thus increased the slush fund by
a constant factor. The invariants are thus satisfied in this case.
B Proof of Lemma 8
Recall that t` =
`(`−1)
2 and T` =
`(`+1)
2 . We will use that they are strictly increasing in `, t1 = 0 and T1 = 1. We will
first argue that
µ · tx − µ · y
µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y ≤
µ · tx−y
µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y .
Before doing so we will show that the denominators in the inequality are positive, i.e. that µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y > 0
and that µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y > 0.
We have that
µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y ≥ µ · t1 + ν · T1 − µ · y = ν − µ · y > 0 ,
using that T` and t` are increasing, x ≥ 1, t1 = 0 and T1 = 1 and ν > µ · y, even if µ > ν.
Also,
µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y
= µ · (x− y)(x− y − 1)
2
+ ν · (x− y)(x− y + 1)
2
= (µ+ ν) · (x− y)(x− y + 1)
2
− (x− y)µ
We consider two cases, µ = ν and µ 6= ν. In the former case, if µ = ν, then
2µ · (x− y)(x− y + 1)
2
− (x− y)µ
= µ(x− y)(x− y + 1)− (x− y)µ > 0 ,
17
using that x > y and µ > 0. Otherwise, consider that µ 6= ν.
(µ+ ν) · (x− y)(x− y + 1)
2
− (x− y)µ
≥ (µ+ ν) · (x− y)(2− y)
2
− (x− y)µ
≥ ν(x− y)− (x− y)(yµ+ yν)
2
> ν(x− y)− (x− y)(ν + yν)
2
≥ 0
using that x ≥ 1, x > y, y ≤ 1, ν > 0 and ν > µ · y, even if µ > ν.
Using that, we consider
µ · tx − µ · y
µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y ≤
µ · tx−y
µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y .
and see that
µ · tx − µ · y
µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y ≤
µ · tx−y
µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y ⇔
(µ · tx − µ · y)(µ · tx−y + ν · Tx−y) ≤
(µ · tx−y)(µ · tx + ν · Tx − µ · y)⇔
µ · ν · tx · Tx−y − µ · ν · y · Tx−y ≤ µ · ν · tx−y · Tx ⇔
tx · Tx−y − y · Tx−y ≤ tx−y · Tx ⇔
x(x− 1)(x− y)(x− y + 1)
4
−y · (x− y)(x− y + 1)
2
≤
(x− y)(x− y − 1)x(x+ 1)
4
⇔
x3 − x2y + xy − x
2
− y · (x− y + 1) ≤ x
3 − x2y − xy − x
2
⇔
xy ≤ y(x− y + 1)⇔
0 ≤ y − y2
Note that 0 ≤ y − y2 because 0 < y ≤ 1.
Next, we consider
µ · tx
µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y ≤
µ · tx+y
µ · tx+y + ν · Tx+y
Like before we first consider the denominators of the inequality. We have that µ · tx+y + ν · Tx+y > 0 because
x+ y ≥ 1, t` and T` are increasing, t1 = 0 and T1 = 1 and µ, ν > 0. To show that
µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y > 0 ,
we consider two cases, y = 1 and y < 1. If y = 1 then x > 1 (because x > y), implying that Tx > 1 and thus
ν · Tx − ν · y > 0 (also µ · tx > 0). If y < 1, then
µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y ≥ ν − ν · y > 0 ,
using that T` and t` are increasing in `, x ≥ 1 and t1 = 0 and T1 = 1.
Using that, we consider
µ · tx
µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y ≤
µ · tx+y
µ · tx+y + ν · Tx+y
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and see that
µ · tx
µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y ≤
µ · tx+y
µ · tx+y + ν · Tx+y ⇔
(µ · tx)(µ · tx+y + ν · Tx+y) ≤
(µ · tx+y)(µ · tx + ν · Tx − ν · y)⇔
µ · ν · tx · Tx+y ≤
µ · ν · tx+y · Tx−µν · y · tx+y ⇔
tx · Tx+y ≤ tx+y · Tx − y · tx+y ⇔
x(x− 1)(x+ y)(x+ y + 1)
4
≤
(x+ y)(x+ y − 1)x(x+ 1)
4
−y · (x+ y)(x+ y − 1)
2
⇔
x3 + x2y − xy − x
2
≤
x3 + x2y + xy − x
2
−y(x+ y − 1)⇔
−xy ≤ −y(x+ y − 1)⇔
0 ≤ y − y2
Again, note that 0 ≤ y − y2 because 0 < y ≤ 1.
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